In Turkey, the treaty with the United States was seen as an extension of the Lausanne Treaty, normalizing relations between the new Turkish Government and the European Powers. But in the United States, the treaty led to an official and public controversy which delayed its ratification, and resulted in its rejection in 1927 by the United States Senate. Stili, the debate surrounding the treaty continued, lasting seven year from its signing in 1923 until 1930 when the Senate finally accepted another, yet virtually identical, treaty with the Turkish Republic.
In the United States, the treaty became one of the instrumental issues in a larger reevaluation of American foreign policy in the post-war era and America's place in global affairs. In this context, American official and public attitudes divided över American-Turkish relations reflecting decisively different views of the Ottoman Empire and the future of Turkey. Overall, this debate led to reevaluation of existing vievvs regarding the Ottoman Empire, the Turks and the nevvly established Turkish Republic. But at the same time, the controversy reinforced images of the "exotic and terrible Turk," and THE TURKISH YEARBOOK [.
concessions for drilling rights in the Empire. 9 interest in mineral resources and facilitation of the transportation of goods by rail spurred American investors such as those represented by Admiral Colby Chester and his sons. The Chesters entered negotiations in 1909 with the Ottoman Government for the right to construct a railroad from Aleppo to iskenderun and exploit mineral resources in eastern Anatolia. 10 With the ircrease in trade and missionary activities, the Ottoman Empire began to enter the imagination of Americans as part of the "East," the "Orient," an exotic, mysterious place, full of intrigue.
11 What distinguished the Ottoman Empire from the "Orient" of China and Japan was islam. In the American imagination, islam carried images of war, fostered in Christian teaching since the age of the Crusades. Furthermore, the popular conception of the Ottoman Empire included men is fezzes and long black moustaches carrying scimitars, and vvomen in veils living in lavish harems. The stereotypical images were reinforced by advertising and marketing of commodities from the Empire, such as tobacco and rugs. Missionaries, businessmen and diplomats who spent time in the Ottoman Empire often reinforced this construction of the "foreign and strange" in their letters, public speeches and memoirs. . 12 Edward Said, in his book Orientalism (New York, 1978) , examines in detail this phenomenon of treating the East as different, and inferior to the West. It is imperative to note that the stereotypes in this imagery were meant to reinforce the concept of "Western superiority" and to justify Western intervention and economic expansionism.
Along with this complex merging of exotic "Oriental," "Islamic" and "Ottoman" images, a darker and threatening concept of the "Terrible Turk" entered into American popular culture. It was fueled by Greek and Armenian immigrants from the Ottoman Empire who brought stories of oppression and massacre of the Christian population by the Ottomans, and the enslavement of Christian children in Müslim harems. Together, these images led to casting the Müslim population of the Ottoman Empire as the adversary of Christian civilization and the "Terrible Turk" as an ignorant, barbaric and fanatic figüre. 13 But these popular constructions did not go unchallenged. Some policy-makers and intellectuals argued that the reforms of the Young Ottomans and Young Turks would turn the Empire to a progressive and enlightened path, leading to stability and open trade policies, thus protecting American interests. For example, Samuel Cox, the American ambassador during the reign of Abdulhamid II, wrote in his memoirs: "I have observed...much of the progress of Turkey within the last three decades, and from what I have seen of it I believe that the Turk...can...bring [Turkey] ...into the light and liberty of a new civilization." 14 Cox argued that contrary to popular notions, the Turks were honest and fair, democratic, and tolerant, and that "the qualities of patience, candor, contentment and resignation are conspicuous beyond those of any other race."
1^ Cox challenged the caricatured image of the Ottoman Empire in the American press, which he described as "strangely anachronous and exaggerative." 16 The official view and foreign policy "towards the Ottoman Empire carried elements of popular stereotypes, and were shaped by increasing trade and missionary interests. Throughout the nineteenth century, while utilizing the same capitulatory privileges as the Europeans, the United States presented itself to the Ottoman Empire as a trading partner with no territorial ambitions, in contrast to the European Powers. 17 Stemming from this distinction, and aimed at maintaining an "open door" to prevent European monopolies on trade and investment in the region, American policy-makers preferred bilateral agreements with the Ottoman Government. As American 
American Policy Towards the Ottoman Empire During WorId War I:
As the war began in Europe, the Ottoman Government announced the abolition of the capitulations, thus eliminating extraterritorial rights in the Empire effective October 1, 1914. In Washington, the State Department worried that the abolition of the capitulations would lead to mass imprisonment of foreigners and seizure of foreign-owned property. Some policy-makers also feared that this decision signalled the possibility of other harmful and differential Ottoman policies, leading to the massacre of Ottoman Christians and Christian foreigners in the Empire. 18 But in the interpretation of some American intellectuals the Ottoman Goverment was "not intent upon [harassing] foreigners, but upon getting rid of an ancient evil," the capitulations, by which Europeans had dominated the Ottoman economy and controlled the Empire's integration into the world market.
19
Even ambassador Morgenthau, whose memoirs reflect a marked dislike of the Turkish people and suspicion regarding implication of the abolition of the capitulations, expressed agreement with Ottoman leaders, who "had protested for years [against the capitulations], declaring that they constituted an insult to their pride as a nation and also interfered with their progress."
20
As the debate about Ottoman intentions progressed, the United States, along with the European countries, continued to argue that unilateral abrogation of the bilaterally negotiated capitulations was unacceptable.
21
Maintaining the legal fiction that the capitulations remained in force, American missionaries and educators, businessmen and diplomats continued their activities much as they had before the war. 22 Also, the official Ottoman posture was to avoid confrontation with the Americans. On the day the capitulation were abolished, in the Empire, and Ottoman officials repeatedly assured the Americans that the government would take no actions against American enterprises.
23
Despite the assurances of the Ottoman Government, the abolition of the capitulations seemed to confirm past prejudices and animosities, leading to grovving suspicion and hostility in American public and official opinion tovvards the Ottoman Empire. The memoirs of Henry Morgenthau, the American ambassador to the Ottoman Empire until 1914, clearly reflect this hostility: "Essentially the Turk is a bully and a coward; he is brave as a lion when things are going his way, but cringing, abject, and nerveless when reverses are overvvhelming him."
24
In September, 1914, enmity was fueled when the Ottoman ambassador to the United States, Ahmed Rüstem Bey, gave an intervievv to the Washington Evening Star, in which he criticized American attitudes tovvards his government, and said Americans had no right to disparage Ottoman treatment of minorities. The ambassador pointed out that American troops had killed thousands of Filipinos who opposed the American conquest of the Philippines at the beginning of the century, and he attacked the treatment of blacks in America. 25 When the Secretary of State asked for an explanation of his comments, the Ottoman ambassador wrote that "[the] attitude of the press has poisoned public opinion in the United States in regard to the Turkish people to such an extent that a member of that race is seldom thought or spoken of in [America] 39 While some Senate members were reluctant to take on a responsibility in what they considered "a far off land," others rejected the mandate över Armenia in support of an independent Armenian Republic. Among the American public, the Senate's rejection of the mandate was supported by those who opposed an American mandate both for Armenia and the Ottoman Empire, and especially a group of prominent Americans who had joined together in 1918 to form the American Committee for the Independence of Armenia. 40 The Committee argued that instead of taking a mandate över Armenia, the United States should recognize its full independence and extend diplomatic and military assistance against the Turks. Labeling the developing Turkish nationalist movement as a panTuranist movement in disguise, the organization argued that "the creation of an Armenian state that will ünite Ararat with Cilicia...alone can become an effective barrier against the pan-Turanian ambition of the Turks of Anatolia." Bristol became an early advocate of better relations with the Turkish nationalists. Overall, Bristol called American policy in the Middle East "too hidebound and conservative" and argued that the rapidly changing circumstances demanded a more flexible policy to counter European attempts to exclude American interest from the region. 44 According to Admiral Bristol, his new policy vvould require a new approach to the Turkish nationalist movement as well as reconsideration of images of Turks as a whole. In reaction to the Methodist Bishop James Cannon, 45 who asked the American Government to protect Christians from the Turks, Bristol told the Bishop that his petition:
"was undoubtedy based upon a misconception of the real conditions...in the Middle East...I laid great emphasis upon the fact that in my opinion there has been spread in America an entirely wrong impression of the situation in the Near East and that our relief committees and missionaries, as well as propaganda press of the Greeks and Armenians, have lent themselves to imparting this wrong information." 46 The views of Admiral Bristol were shared by Admiral Colby Chester, the representative of a group of American businessmen seeking a commercial concession from the Ottoman Government. After returning from a trip to 43 Chester continued, calling on American businessmen to examine the opportunities in Turkey: "Returning, I feel that I have come from the most wonderful country in the world, the country which offers the greatest opportunities to the American businessman. The Turks need almost everything which America can wish to seli to them, and they are the best of people to deal with." 49 and maintained efforts to restore the capitulations in the hope of preventing the taxation or seizure of American property and commerce, the arrest and trial of Americans by Turkish courts, and the imposition of higher tariffs on American goods. 50 The acknovvledgement of the nationalist government in Ankara only led the State Department to expect both the İstanbul and Ankara governments to reinstate the capitulations.
The capitulations were an American policy objective agreed upon by both interventionists and isolationists, who were locked in a domestic power struggle after the First World War, regarding the future of American foreign policy. The Senate's rejection of the treaty of the League of Nations in 1919, ' followed by its rejection of the mandate for Armenia, confronted President Wilson's cali for a more active and interventionist American foreign policy. This reaction reflected sentiment in favor of more limited American involvement in world affairs, signalling the dominance of the isolationists. remained aloof in the struggle betvveen the nationalist government in Ankara and the Ottoman Government and Sultan in istanbul, and in the war between the nationalist and foreign occupation armies in Anatolia. When the Greek armies were driven out of izmir in September 1922, the American fleet did nothing beyond trying to protect American tobacco warehouses from the fire that consumed the water front
The United States and the Lausanne Conference:
In October 1922 the European Powers announced an invitation to the nationalist Government of Ankara, as well as to the Ottoman Government of istanbul to negotiate a settlement at Lausanne, Switzerland. 51 As the head of the Turkish delegation, the Ankara Government decided to send ismet Pasha, who had served as Commander of the Western Armies in the War of Independence, and successfully negotiated the armistice at Mudanya on October 11, 1922. The Turkish delegation also included Minister of Health Rıza Nur Bey and the former Minister of Finance Hasan Bey (Saka), along with more than twenty military, financial and legal advisers. Beside Turkey, Great Britain, France and Italy, representatives of Japan, Greece, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Soviet Russia, the Ukraine and Georgia also announced their intention to participate in the conference.
52
When the European Powers invited the United States to participate in the negotiations, the Americans responded that "the United States was neither at war with Turkey nor a party to the armistice of 1918 and does not desire to participate in final peace negotiations or to assume responsibility for the political and territorial adjustments which may be effected." 53 The United States wanted to limit its involvement, yet was concerned about the impact of negotiations at Lausanne on American interests in the Middle East. In early October 1922, Bristol wrote to Charles Evans Hughes, the Secretary of State: "As the United States is one of the capitulatory powers with extensive vested interests in Turkey, we cannot afford to remain inactive while the 51 The dual invitation precipitated a decision by the nationalist government of Ankara to abolish the Sultanate and declare itself the sole representative of the Turkish people. As a result of these concerns, the State Department took three steps to assure the protection of American interests. First, the United States sent observers to the conference to make certain American interests were not adversely affected by the negotiations. Second, it presented the European Allies with a list of American interests and concerns in the negotiations, and third, the United States announced its intention to negotiate a separate treaty with the new Turkish Government, at an appropriate time. 55 The list of American concerns and interests presented to the European Powers formed the basis of American activities at the Lausanne Conference, and served as the foundation of negotiations for the separate treaty with the new Turkish Government. The State Department listed seven issues, including the maintenance of the capitulations; the protection of American philanthropic, educational and religious institutions; an "open door" for commercial enterprises; indemnity for losses suffered by Americans during the war; provisions for the protection of minorities; assurances of the freedom of the Straits, and opportunity for archeological research. The capitulations would prove to be among the most intransigent issues at the Lausanne Conference. Although the State Department anticipated that the Turkish negotiators would resist restoration of the capitulations, especially on economic grounds, it was determined nevertheless to insist upon "the retention of the capitulations which are essential to the protection of American citizens." 57 The State Department also believed that the capitulations were necessary to protect the welfare of the Greeks and Armenians, and was convinced that American public opinion would demand that the treaty provide international protection of the Christians. In March 1923, an official in the Division of Near Eastern Affairs of the State Department wrote:
"If, in negotiating the treaty with Turkey, we leave out ali considerations of a purely ethical nature, we must be prepared to take the conequences. But the issue of protection of Christians was not easily resolved. The State Department had no clear evidence that the nationalist Government of Ankara had abused the Christians, or that it would do so in the future. İsmet Pasha, leader of the Turkish delegation, assured the participants at Lausanne that the new Turkish Government guaranteed protection of the lives and property of ali citizens. İsmet Pasha was also unyielding in the position that the new government would not allow restrictions on its sovereignty, or interference in domestic and foreign affairs.
In the State Department's complex agenda, the protection of Christians coincided with, and also lcgitimated, the protection of American investments and economic interests. In particular, the American delegation at Lausanne was intent on preserving privileges and opportunities for American commerce and investment equal to those obtained by the European Powers. Throughout the conference, and in direct negotiations with the Turkish delegation, the American diplomats insisted on the principle of the "open door" economic policy and most favored nation status in trade and tariffs, along with the protection of Christians. 59 But the main objective of the American team emerged as preventing the European Povvers from establishing monopolies to the detriment of American interests in the region, vvhile reaching an accord with the new Turkish Government to assure access to markets and investments in the Middle East. After the conference resumed in April, İsmet Pasha suggested on May 5th that formal negotiations begin for a treaty to restore normal diplomatic and commercial relations. 63 Grew later recounted in his memoirs:
"As for ismet Pasha, my opinion of him underwent several changes during the course of the conference, but my final judgement is that, while lacking any of the adaptability or finesse of his opponents, he played a straight and honest game throughout...After ali, in Ismet's position, it was the bluff qualities of the soldier and not the subtlety of the old-school diplomat which he needed and vvhich he exercised throughout."
64
When the final draft of the Lausanne Treaty between the Turkish Government and the European povvers was prepared, the Americans, although formally discussing a separate treaty, reconsidered whether or not they should add their signature to the multilateral agreement. While they felt that signing the treaty would assure America of the same rights and privileges as the Europeans, it could also obligate the United States to poliçe the Straits, and take responsibility for the Christians in Turkey as part of European designs in the Middle East. 64 Grew, "Peace Conference of Lausanne," pp. 5-6. In a letter to his father-inlaw at the time, Grew was even more effusive in his praise: "ismet is Napoleonic -the greatest diplomatist in history. He has played every one of us to a standstill. And he has done it fairly and squarely, ali growls to the contrary notwithstanding. The Treaty of Amity and Commerce was meant to be the foundation of normal diplomatic and commercial relations between the newly established Government of Turkey and the United States. For the Turkish delegation, and İnönü, the agreement with the United States had a lesser importance in comparison with the Lausanne Treaty. inönü deseribes the American aetions during the conference as friendly and helpful, yet guarded and concerned with proteeting their interests. The American posture fit with the Turkish vision of the United States as a distant and amicable power. According to İnönü, when Grew approached him to establish a relationship with Turkey, İnönü felt he could extend the same terms to America as contained in the Lausanne Treaty with the Europeans, in order to normalize Turkish foreign relations. 70 vvilling to accept an altered version that inönü proposed. According to inönü, the second version was the text that the Turkish delegation brought as the Turkish Government's original proposal to Lausanne. İnönü points out that the difference between the two treaties was a difference of vvords, not even sentences. inönü, Hatıralar, Vol. II, p 151. According to Joseph Grew, who wrote to Secretary Hughes "it was we [the American delegation] who laid the original draft treaty before the Turks." Grew, Turbulent Era, Vol. I, p. 601. Despite the apparent disagreement on the origins of the treaty, the final produet was very elose to the Lausanne Treaty. its majör distinetion was that while the American-Turkish agreement was bilateral, and bound the sides as such, the Lausanne Treaty was a multilateral agreement. 67 In Turkey the treaty with America was ratified as a matter of course, along with the Lausanne Treaty. But in the United States, the treaty immediately met with a storm of protest from critics of the treaty and opponents of relations with Turkey. It also brought new voices to the surface in support of relations with the newly established Turkish Government.
The American Debate on Relations with Turkey: Opponents and Proponents:
Joseph Grew was apprehensive about the treaty. In a letter to Secretary of States Charles Evans Hughes on the day of the signing, he wrote: "The Treaty...is far from what I should have wished to have it. It represents a considerably greater number of concessions on our part...than...on their part."
71 Following the signing of the treaty, Grew also anticipated conflict and opposition: "There were stili in our country elements which were dissatisfied that I had not been able to pull impossible rabbits from impossible hats. I was openly accused in the United States Senate of having sold my nation's birthright for a mess of pottage." 72 Opposition was not new, and its now solidified argument contested the government's initiative to establish relations with Turkey under the terms of the treaty. Thus, partly due to the sudden death of President Warren Harding, and especially in anticipation of strong opposition in the Congress, the treaty was not submitted to the Senate for nine months. Actually, the debate över the treaty, and controversy över terms of the relations with Turkey, lasted another three years, until 1927.
Opponents of the treaty in the Senate, as well as among the public, concentrated their criticism in three main arguments. The first was that the treaty did not obtain ali it could or should have from the Turkish side, in particular restoration of the capitulations. Opponents accused Joseph Grew and the State Department of being "soft" on the Turks and not forcing the Turkish Government to make more concessions. The second issue raised by opponents was that the treaty contained no specific clause to guarantee the protection of Christians in Turkey, or allovvances for foreign intervention on their behalf. Related to this, opponents raised a third issue. They maintained that the treaty protected commercial interests at the expense of what they saw as America's moral obligation to the Christians.
Proponents argued that the Turkish-American treaty secured the same rights for the United States as the Lausanne Treaty allowed to the European Powers, thus more favorable terms could not have been obtained. 71 Grew, Turbulent Era, Vol. I, p. 601. 72 Grew, "Peace Conference of Lausanne," p. 2. Furthermore, they argued that the only way for America to protect Christians was by force, contrary to isolationist foreign policy sentiments, and requiring a costly military commitment in the region. Proponents also maintained that the treaty protected the legitimate interests of ali Americans and American institutions in Turkey, not only commercial enterprises.
On the side of the debate supporting ratification of the treaty were prominent members of the State Department, Opponents of the treaty were ready, and quickly launehed a campaign to sway public opinion, in the expectation that public pressure vvould lead the Senate to reject the treaty. Their campaign included books and pamphlets, protest meetings and letter writing campaigns. For example, The American Committee for the independence of Armenia reported that by the Spring of 1922 it had already distributed 246.500 copies of 321 different pamphlets, mailed 17.000 personal letters and telegrams, and mass mailcd 173.000 letters. According to the report, on one occasion, the Committee distributed pamphlets to 116.000 churches, asking them to write to the President and to Congress in favor of Armenian independence. The Committee had also secured the names of 20.000 ministers and priests, 250 college presidents in favor of Armenian indenpendence, during the Allied occupation of Anatolia and the Turkish War of independence. 73 When the Turkish-American treaty was signed at Lausanne, the Committee expanded its efforts to fight against establishing relations with Turkey as well as terms of the Lausanne Treaty. The efforts of the American Committee Opposed to the Lausanne Treaty played an important role first in delaying considcration of the treaty, and in its ultimate rejection by the Senate. The debate following the signature of the treaty in Lausanne shovved considerable continuity wih the pre-war discussions in America about the Ottoman Empire and about American policy in the Middle East. For example, James Gerard, emphasizing the image of the "Terrible Turk," wrote to Secretary of State Hughes in November, 1923 that he had the assurances of a number of Senators of both parties that they were "hostile to the treaty" because it did not protect Christians in Turkey, and the Turks could not be trusted to honor their obligations. Gerard argued that since the Senate would certainly reject the treaty, it would "be more dignified [for the State Department] to denounce the treaty" immediately, and refuse to establish relations with Turkey until it recognizcd the independence of an Armenian state in Anatolia. 74 Gerard's position also represented a belief shared by many opponents of the treaty that American refusal to enter into relations with Turkey could force changes in the region, or at least vvould have a decisive impact on the foreign and domestic policies of the new Turkish Republic. Their initiative reflected a conviction in American foreign policy as a force for "morality" in international affairs, therefore America's special duty to protect Christians against Muslims in the Middle East. Furthermore, they feared economic considerations were overshadovving this mission and they accused the State Department of catering to commercial interests, in particular the Chester Concession, which included oil exploration in eastern Anatolia. 75 For example, in December, 1923 a group of private citizens in Philadelphia, organized as the Society for Justice in the Near East, issued a statement attacking the State Department and the treaty, saying it was "smeared ali över with oil and blood." 76 The complexity of the discussion derived from the issue of "morality" in the making of American foreign policy. While opponents argued that it was America's moral obligation to reject the treaty, proponents were equally convinced that without the treaty, America could not exert moral influence on Turkey. Also, proponents of the treaty pointed out that the multilateral Lausanne Treaty declared the European acceptance of the independence of 
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Turkey and the sovereignty of the Turkish Government över its domestic affairs. Thus, refusal of the United States to accept Turkey would reduce American influence in the region, relative to the European Povvers. In addition, supporters maintained that since the Europeans accepted the abolition of the capitulations, the United States could not obtain privileges denied other countries in the making of Turkish foreign and domestic policy, which would also be interpreted by the European Powers as a hostile intervention in the region. On these lines, supporters argued that since the Lausanne Treaty made no provision for the concept of an independent Armenia, the United States could not force its acceptance.
In January, 1924 Secretary of States Hughes addressed the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. In defense of the treaty, Hughes argued: "The Lausanne Treaty is such a treaty as would be negotiated with any other sovereign state,...it gives us the same rights as other countries will enjoy under the new regime, and...by regularizing our relations with Turkey, now interrupted for nearly seven years, it will provide safeguards for American educational, philanthropic and commercial interests in Turkey." 81 Academic discussion of the treaty reached a height when the journal Forum published a debate in 1924, betvveen Albert Bushnell Hart and Edward Meade Earle of Columbia University. Hart argued that the Tuıks were "barbarous people whose government is oppression, whose tax system is plunder, and whose idea of war is torture, fire and blood." According the Hart, the very idea of a treaty with Turkey was unthinkable: "When the real character of the so-called Turkish nation is made clear, and when the weakness of the foundations of the Treaty is exposed, then no arguments that it is favorable...have any weight, because [Turkey] is not a sound, permanent and responsible nation." 82 Earle, on the other hand, castigated opponents of the treaty: "Our Turcophobes, amateur and professional, insist that ratification of the treaty vvould be a humiliating spectacle, -a great, powerful America ignobly bowing before a puny and anaemic Turkey; a generous Christian government extending the hand of friendship to a 'government of murderers', the American Senate placing its stamp of approval upon the Armenian massacres. This conception of the importance of the Turkish Treaty exhibits a warped, if not frenzied, perspective." 83 Earle pointed out that the treaty was not designed to remakc history, but merely to establish normal relations betvveen the United States and the Turkish Republic. Earle continued to argue that opponents of the treaty were hypocritical: "In every thousand persons, who assert that national minorities and foreigners will not obtain justice in Turkish courts, it would be difficult to find one who does not pass över in silence the fact that Negroes enjoy little protection from court in the South, and that there is no such thing as judicial impartiality toward the Japanese on the Pacific coast...It is not necessary to multiply illustrations of our willingness -nay, our eagerness-to mete out one measure to the Turks, another to other peoples, and yet a third to ourselves."
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As the State Department rallied support for its position, its efforts brought into focus sharp differences. After ali, the debate about relations with Turkey and the terms of the treaty was not only about Turkey, it was becoming increasingly a platform for the expression of opposing views of the meaning of America, and commitment and mission in its domestic and foreign policies. And most importantly, this discussion became a way to debate options for the future of the United States in world affairs.
The Battle in the Senate Över Relations with Turkey:
In May, 1924 President Calvin Coolidge submitted the TurkishAmerican treaty to the Senate for its consideration, which intensifıed the activities of both its opponents and proponents. The Committee Opposed to the Lausanne Treaty published new pamphlets, entitled "The Lausanne Treaty and Kemalist Turkey," and "The Senate Should Reject the Turkish Treaty," declaring that the "honor of America demands [its] rejection." The pamphlets derided Mustafa Kemâl as a military despot, and called the treaty "utterly humiliating and purposeless." According to the Committee, the United States had surrendered ali of its rights and abandoned the Christians to a despotic, corrupt and barbaric state ruled by enemies of civilization.
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In August, 1924 Admiral Bristol, High Commissioner in istanbul, wrote to the Secretary of State specifically to refute "the many inaccuracies" in the accusations made by the Committee Opposed to the Lausanne Treaty. Bristol argued that the pamphlets published by the committee suffered from a "general tone of inaccuracy and exaggeration."
86 He maintained that the treaty was necessary to protect American interests in Turkey, and that it was basically no different that dozens of other treaties the United States had contracted with other sovereign states, vvithout popular debate or opposition. 87 Bristol's cali for ratification of the treaty to protect American interests was supported by Herbert Hoover, the Secretary of Commerce, and later president after Calvin Coolidge. In a letter to the Secretary of State, Hoover called attention "to the importance, from the viewpoint of American commerce, of the prompt ratification of the treaty with Turkey. Hoover's efforts in favor of the treaty were followed up by visits to Senators by Ailen Dulles, of the Division of Near Estern Affairs. In his talks, Dulles stressed "the importance of the treaty not only for the protection of our trade but for the protection of our schools and other philanthropic enterprises in the Near East." Dulles also pointed out that Turkey was strategically important to the United States: "The possession of the Straits gave it added importance from the point of view of American trade and commerce and the provision in our treaty for passage through the Straits for our ships of commerce and of war was of great significance."90
In February, 1925, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, chaired by Senatör William Borah, an established supporter of the treaty, reported favorably and sent it to the Senate for a full vote. But two weeks later, the treaty was sent back to the Foreign Relations Committee after a test vote revealed the treaty did not have suffıcient support for ratification. The treaty remained in committee for another year before the Foreign Relations Committee again voted in favor and returned it the Senate. But in early July, 1926 Borah proposed that the vote on the treaty be postponed until after the congressional elections, thus delaying Senate debate until the first day of the new session in January, 1927.
The delay in the vote on the treaty gave opponents and proponents time for a final effort. The Committee Opposed to the Lausanne Treaty published a new pamphlet, entitled "Kemal's Slave Market and the Lausanne Treaty." The pamphlet maintained that betvveen 100.000 and 400.000 Christian girls and children were being held in slavery in Turkish harems, being sold into captivity by the Kemâlist government, and issued a plea: "We think of a multitude of white Christian women, girls and children, helpless in the hands of Moslem owners -unable to escape from Moslem bondagesubject to foul indignity and bestial brutality...We think of refıned, educated, Christian girls in the power of the unspeakable Türk."
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At the same time, Joseph Manning, episcopal bishop of New York, told a meeting of the Girls' Friendly Society that 100.000 Christian girls were being held in Turkish harems. 92 In Despite the grovving opposition, State Department officials maintained their position. Acknowledging opposition to the treaty, Admiral Bristol wrote in January, 1926 that ratification of the treaty would simply afford a means of protecting legitimate American interests, but did not require condoning past Ottoman actions or approval of the new rĞgime: "We ask for ratification simply because we cannot see why perfectly tangible American interests in Turkey should not receive that measure of proper and normal support which our government extends to similar American interests in other parts of the world."
94 Ailen Dulles also believed the treaty would increase American influence in Turkey, and did not restrict America from taking action in the future on behalf of the Christians. 95 In March, 1926 Dulles summarized seven points in favor of ratification: (1) the treaty enabled the United States to protect American interests in Turkey; (2) Americans in Turkey vvanted the treaty ratified; (3) American activities were being conducted on an unsatisfactory basis without treaty protection; (4) opinions about Turkey had nothing to do with the need for a treaty; (5) Americans were at any rate unvvilling to use military force to protect the rights of Armenians; (6) the treaty would help America's trade with the Black Sea region; and (7) ratification of the treaty did not condone the Ottoman past or the present regime.
96 Joseph Grevv also urged that the treaty would increase America's positive influence in Turkey, and America's influence would decrease without the treaty. 97 In May, 1926 Secretary of State Frank Kellogg argued that Turkey had a nevv government and a modern legal system, and that the new government was not the same as the Ottoman regime, thus the changes in Turkey should be recognized and supported by ratification of the treaty. Thus, the new organization collected statements and reports in a 164-page book, The Treaty with Turkey-Why it Should Be Ratified, and distributed 1.000 copies to Senators and the press. 108 Furthermore, the General Committee in Favor of Ratifîcation sent correspondence to gather support to 148 institutions and organizations, and press notices favoring the treaty were sent to 889 editors of American newspapers. When Congress reconvened in December, 1926, the General Committee established headquarters at the Raleigh Hotel in Washington in order to lobby senators. On December 17th, 2.000 copies of a new 224-page book in support of the treaty were printed and distributed among policy-makers.
When the Senate reconvened in January, 1927 after the Congressional elections the vote on the Turkish-American Treaty was scheduled for January 18th. On the seventeenth, the General Committee issued an additional statement in favor of the treaty, and distributed 300 copies to senators and the press. 109 Yet, the Senate voted against the treaty, 50 to 34, six votes short of the two-thirds majority needed for ratification. After nearly four years of rancorous debate, the treaty with Turkey was defeated. Following the vote, Senators reported three main reasons for rejecting the treaty, First, many felt the new treaty was not as good as the 1830 treaty, since it accepted the abolition of the capitulation. Second, they felt that American commercial interests in Turkey were of minör importance, and it would be wrong to accept a flawed treaty for the sake of a few oil and tobacco companies. Finally, senators referred to the opposition of American religious groups, and claimed the treaty had been rejected on moral grounds. 108 Overall, the articles in the book stressed three main points of supporters.
First, American interests would be hurt if the treaty was not ratified, and the current treaty was as good of a treaty as could be negotiated. Second, rejection of the treaty would do nothing to help Christians in Turkey. Only by ratification could America hope to increase its influence in the Turkish Republic regarding matters of internal affairs. The third issue raised was the reform of institutions and laws which were being carried out by the Turkish Government. According to supporters of the treaty, the Turkish Republic was a modem, democratic and progressive country. Americans would be wise to support the changes occurring in Turkey and the best way to support reforms was by normalizing diplomatic and commercial relations. 
Aftermath of the Rejection of the Treaty-Restoration of Relations vvith Turkey and its Implications:
On the day after the Senate rejection, Secretary of State Kellogg instructed Admiral Bristol to give the news of the rejection to the Turkish Government: "You will explain that the executive branch...has spared no efforts to obtain the approval of the treaty by the Senate, and that the explanation of the negative action of the Senate is to be found in the domestic political situation in the United States."
111 Kellogg hoped that the rejection of the treaty would not lead to a strong reaction by the Turkish Government, and instructed Bristol to argue emphatically that the United States "vvould sincerely regret any change in the friendly relations which have existed during the past few years between the two countries despite the lack of a modern treaty relationship."
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In fact, the Turkish reaction was muted, and comment in the Turkish press emphasized the Turkish Government's view that despite the rejection of the treaty, relations with the United States would continue to develop. This view was shared by President Calvin Coolidge. When the Senate rejected the treaty, Coolidge was confronted with four options. He could abandon the treaty and relations with Turkey; he could try to negotiate a new treaty, acceptable to the Senate; he could submit it to the Senate for reconsideration, or he could ignore the rejection and use executive powers to establish relations with Turkey. But, the State Department believed it was too late to try to negotiate a new treaty vvith different terms. Coolidge also concluded that there was little chance the Senate would reconsider the existing treaty without substantial revisions. Therefore, he decided on the fourth option of normalizing relations vvith Turkey vvithout a formal treaty.
While in Ankara, Admiral Bristol explored possible ways to establish normal diplomatic and commercial relations betvveen Turkey and the United States. Över the course of the next month, the tvvo governments agreed that relations could be confirmed by an exchange of notes, vvhich vvould grant each other most favored nation status, and allovv normal diplomatic and consular funetions. The executive initiation of relations with Turkey met with a storm of protest from opponents, and approval from supporters. In April, the Armenian Press Bureau held a mass protest meeting in New York, presided över by Vahan Cardashian, and speakers included Senatör William King, James Gerard and David Hunter Miller, the Chairman of the Committee Opposed to the Lausanne Treaty. Cardashian maintained that the treaty had been negotiated "for the promotion of special interests," and argued that while a handful of Americans favored relations with Turkey, nearly a million former subjects of the Ottoman Empire, now American citizens, many of whom had fought in World War I, opposed President Coolidge's decision. 114 Cardashian also wrote a scathing letter to Secretary of State Kellogg, calling him, Bristol and James Barton "lie factories," and accusing the State Department of entering "a conspiracy with Turkey to steal the homes of a million Armenian refugees and exiles, in the interest of an oil syndicate."
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In May and June, 1927 Armenian-American groups held meetings in New York, Detroit, Cleveland, Chicago, Niagara Falls, Lavvrence-Massachusetts, and Racine-Wisconsin, to protest and denounce "the injustices and nefarious designs of the State Department upon the Armenian people and their homes as a reproach to Christianity and to American ideals of justice and fairdealing, and as one of the blackest pages of diplomatic history."
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At the same time, supporters of the treaty were actively pursuing further initiatives. Rayford Alley, of the General Committee in Favor of Ratification of the Treaty with Turkey, wrote to Coolidge in February 1927, urging him to resubmit the treaty to the Senate as soon as possible. Alley was convinced that with additional hearings, the Senate could be persuaded to pass the treaty in the next legislative session. 117 The General Committee also published a new pamphlet, American Public Opinion Condemns the Failure to Ratify the American-Turkish Treaty, bringing together editorials from nevvspapers. The pamphlet named seventy-five nevvspapers that condemned the failure to ratify, and seventeen that supported rejection of the treaty. The Houston Chronicle vvrote: "It is hard to see how anything is to be gained by refusing the ratification, and it is easy to see how much may be lost." The New York Evening World wrote: "The rejection of the Lausanne Treaty with Turkey was based on sentiment rather than the realities." The Kansas City Star called the Senate's vote "a futile gesture of protest. It will accomplish nothing except to injure the work and Turkey was able to negotiate her own peace treaty," 121 symbolizing Turkey's assertion of itself. Even though the treaty contained problems that influenced Turkish domestic and foreign policy in the future, as İnönü stated, the Lausanne Treaty became a certificate of rebirth of the Turkish Republic on a global level. 122 In Turkey, the merits of the Lausanne Treaty and the Treaty of Amity and Commerce betvveen Turkey and the United States were also debated among the public and in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. but Turkish foreign policy-makers vievved the American debate and delay in its ratification with concern and curiosity. The seven year delay in ratification of a treaty by the United States Senate was seen neither as a friendly gesture nor as affirmation of American support for the new democratic Turkish Republic.
In America, the debate surrounding the Treaty of Amity and Commerce between the United States and Turkey was not an isolated incident, or a single event. It refleeted a long standing expression of ambivalence towards the Ottoman Empire in the public mind, and among policy-makers in the United States, its timing framed a confrontation which led Americans to rethink existing relations in the post-war world, and it was part of a debate on the changing status of the United States in global affairs. Thus, the seven year long debate was not only about Turkey, but about America's future. Many arguments of this debate continued to surface throughout the period during and after World War II, when America expanded its commitments in the Middle East. In the case of Turkey, two images contended in the minds of policy-makers: the land of the "Terrible Turk" versus the strategic ally and the "open door" in the Middle East. As a result, old feelings of mistrust and the new need to establish trust linked various strands in American foreign policy making, transforming Turkey's image into one of an elusive ally.
